Andre Martin

Abstract: In De anima III.5, after Aristotle’s well-known discussion of an intellect which passively “receives” all things, Aristotle raises the cryptic discussion of an intellect which, in contrast, somehow actively “makes” all things understood: i.e., the so-called “agent intellect”. Less often discussed, in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De anima (Bk. II, c.60), Averroes provides an argument for an analogous “extrinsic mover” in sensation: i.e., an “agent sense”. However, it's perhaps even more cryptic what this agent sense could be. Just where do we find this “external” sense and what exactly does it do that sensible objects or the traditional senses don’t do? In this project, I examine some of the earliest possible discussions relevant for this topic in the Latin West and examine how different figures seem to conceive of this view. On the one hand, Albert the Great (c.1254-57) appears to have the first devoted (albeit, negative) discussion of Averroes’ view. On the other hand, Albert also alludes to “many of our doctors” as holding such a view beforehand. As I examine, Albert’s primary source seems to be a peculiar theory of light made popular by Robert Grosseteste and spread through his circle of early thirteenth-century Oxford Franciscans (including, e.g., Richard Rufus of Cornwall). According to this theory, light (of some sort) is the single mover responsible for making all sensibles sensible in act, not just the visible. Although Pattin (1988), in the secondary literature, briefly quotes these sources, he makes no comment on the confusing (and on Albert’s part, confused) start to this Latin tradition. For example, Albert explicitly distinguishes two agent sense theories, one of which claims this agent is a heavenly light, the other claims this agent is in the soul. According to Albert, only the latter theory is said to have Augustine’s authority on its side. However, Albert’s sources in fact hold that both an external and an internal “light” (of the heavens and of the soul) are required for sensation. Moreover, Grosseteste and his circle curiously use Augustine to bolster both parts of this theory, not just the latter part. It’s less clear whether Grosseteste or his students allude to Averroes’ “agent sense” itself but there are some suggestive passages (e.g., from Richard Rufus) which have so far gone unnoticed.